Plaintiffs challenge President Trump's executive orders on "Ending Radical and Wasteful DEI Programs and Preferencing," "Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government," and "Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity."

Plaintiffs allege that the executive orders:

• are unconstitutionally vague, because they use ill-defined and subjective terms that lend themselves to conflicting interpretations, making it impossible for a person of ordinary intelligence to know what is prohibited;

• chill and censor Plaintiffs' speech and viewpoints in violation of the First Amendment, by making clear that the administration will end funding to organizations that express views with which the administration disagrees;

• intentionally discriminate against Black individuals and other people of color on the basis of race, and also discriminate on the basis of sex and transgender status; and

• exceed the president's authority by usurping Congress's power of the purse and by violating applicable statutes.

The lawsuit seeks a declaration that the executive orders are unlawful, unconstitutional, and invalid, as well as a permanent injunction restraining the president and other defendants from implementing or enforcing them.

On May 2, 2025, the court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, which would have paused implementation of the challenged provisions while the case continues to be litigated. As a threshold matter, the court found that Plaintiffs likely had standing to sue for some, but not all, of the challenged provisions, specifically those related to funding, because they had shown harm. The court concluded that the Gender Funding Termination Provision, the Promoting Gender Ideology Provision, the Equity Termination Provision, and the Certification Provision could lead to, and in some cases may have already led to, a loss of funding.

Regarding the preliminary injunction, the court found that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Regarding Plaintiffs' claims that the provisions chilled and censored their speech, the court explained that while the Constitution allows the government to place some conditions on speech when providing funding, it becomes unconstitutional if the government uses that funding to control speech outside the scope of the funded program or requires grantees to express specific beliefs as a condition of receiving funds. The court found that the government likely had not crossed that line in this case.

As for Plaintiffs' claim that the provisions were unconstitutionally vague, the court also found that they were unlikely to succeed. It reasoned that constitutional protections requiring clear notice of what's prohibited only apply when there is a protected interest at stake in life, liberty, or property. The court concluded that Plaintiffs had not shown that these government contracts were a protected interest.